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JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-610(4) allows a member who is aggrieved by a decision of the Utah
State Retirement Board to obtain judicial review by complying with the procedures and requirements
of Chapter 46b, Title 63, the Administrative Procedures Act.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 confers jurisdiction on the Supreme Court or other appellate
court designated by statute to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative
hearings.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) confers jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals over the final
orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Was the Administrative Law Judge correct in determining that Appellant Ronald

Alfred's overtime was not the direct and sole result of his promotion?
2.

Did Appellee Utah State Retirement Board properly apply the 10% limitation to

increases in compensation found at Utah Code Ann. § 49-3-103(7) to Appellant Ronald Alfred's
case?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

The proper standard of review is whether there was substantial evidence to support

the findings of the Administrative Law Judge. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46-16(4) (g), Kennecott Corp.
v. State Tax Comm'n. 858 P. 2d 1381, 1385 (1993). The Appellate Court does not conduct a de
novo credibility determination or reweigh the evidence. Ouestar Pipeline Co. v. State Tax Comm'a
850 P. 2d 1175,1178 (Utah 1993). An agency's Findings of Fact are accorded substantial deference
and will not be overturned if based on substantial evidence, even if another conclusion from the
iv

evidence is permissible. Hurley v. Board of Review. 767 P. 2d 524, 526-527 (Utah 1988). It is the
province of the agency, not the Appellete Court, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where
inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the agency to draw the
inference. Albertson's Inc. v. Department of Emp. Sec. 854 P. 2d 570, 575 (Utah App. 1993).
2.

The proper standard of review is one of reasonableness and rationality (abuse of

discretion standard) in light of the interpretations urged by the parties. Morton Int'l v. State Tax
Comm'n. 814 P. 2d 581,589 (Utah 1992); Nucor Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n. 832 P. 2d 1294,1296
(Utah 1992).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 49-3-103(7), Exhibit "A"
Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-203(1) (g), Exhibit "B"
Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-204(17), Exhibit "C"
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-10(3), Exhibit "D"
Utah Rule of Evidence 801(c), Exhibit "E"
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Utah Code Ann. § 49-3-103(7) states that an employee's compensation is subject to a 10%
per year limitation of increase for purposes of calculating a retirement benefit, except for three
narrowly defined exceptions. Appellant Ronald Allred ("Allred") has failed to prove that his
situation falls within the narrow exceptions. Appellee Utah State Retirement Board ("Board") has
correctly applied the 10% limitation to Allred and has calculated his retirement benefit accordingly.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Allred terminated his employment with Utah Department of Transportation on

July 30,1994. (R 109)
2.

Allred set his retirement date as August 1, 1994, and was eligible for retirement

benefits from the Utah State Retirement Systems as of that date. (R 109)
3.

In September 1993, Allred received a promotion and his base salary was increased

from fifteen dollars and seven cents ($15.07) per hour to sixteen dollars and fifty six cents ($16.56)
per hour. (R 110)
4.

Allred received no overtime pay in between early 1991 and July 1993. (R 110)

5.

In July 1993, three (3) months prior to his promotion, and one (1) year prior to his

termination of employment, Allred began receiving substantial overtime pay. (R 60,110)
6.

Allred presented no evidence attempting to link his overtime to his promotion until

after the hearing and after the Board had already filed it's Memorandum in this matter. (R 16-40,4145, 88-107)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The Utah Public Employees Noncontributory Retirement System at issue in this case

is created and governed by Chapter 3, Title 49, of the Utah Code. The statutory scheme and actuarial
background of Title 49, Chapter 3, must be understood in order to appropriately apply the 10%
limitation in this case.
2.

As a general rule, an employee's salary is limited to a 10% increase per year for

purposes of calculating a retirement benefit. The statute provides for three narrowly defined
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exceptions to the general rule. The facts surrounding Allred's case do not fall within one of the
recognized exceptions and therefore the Board appropriately applied the 10% limitation.
3.

Allred's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 49-3-103(7) (c) would render the

remainder of Section 103(7) meaningless and is therefore not an interpretation which can be
accepted by this Court.
4.

Allred failed to meet his burden of proof at the hearing and failed to submit any

evidence to support his position until after the evidentiary hearing and after the Board had already
filed it's Memorandum in this matter. Furthermore, Allred is attempting to base a Finding of Fact
solely on hearsay evidence, a position which is not allowed under Utah law.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
STATUTORY CONTEXT OF THE LIMITATION ON INCREASE OF
COMPENSATION
The Utah Public Employees Noncontributory Retirement System ("System") is governed by
the Utah State Retirement Board ("Board") and is created pursuant to Chapter 3, Title 49 of the Utah
Code Annotated. To fully understand how the limitation at issue in this case is meant to function,
the overall statutory scheme of this system must be understood. To date, Allred's arguments have
failed to understand and adequately address the workings of the System. For example, in his
Appellate brief, Allred alleges that the Board has attempted to use the standard of "sound business
judgment" to operate the System. Nowhere in the record has the Board ever made such a statement
and, in fact, the Board has never used the "sound business practice" standard in administering the
System.
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Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-203(1)(g) requires the Board to operate the System and the other
retirement systems on an actuarial sound basis. Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-204(17) requires the
Executive Director of the Retirement System, at least biennially, to investigate the actuarial
soundness of the System and, when necessary, recommend proper actions to maintain the soundness
of the System.
The statutes governing the benefits payable under the System are designed to maintain the
System on an actuarial sound basis, as well as maximizing the benefits available to all members of
the System, which is another statutory mandate given in Chapter 1, Title 49. The 10% limitation at
issue in this case, found in Utah Code Ann. § 49-3-103(7) is one of the checks built into the statute
to maintain the actuarial soundness of the System. This check prevents retirees from receiving
inflated retirement benefits which do not truly reflect their earnings growth during their career. The
limitations are simply one aspect of the retirement benefit calculation set forth in the statute. The
calculation of a retirement benefit is based on the compensation earned during three (3) years of an
employee's career. The limitation at issue simply states that the amount of compensation received
in any one of those years used in calculating the retirement allowance cannot exceed the prior year
by more than 10%, plus inflation, with certain exceptions to be discussed below.
Funding the System on an actuarially sound basis requires elementary assumptions that
members will work for a specified period of time and will receive increases in compensation based
on inflation, merit and promotion over that period of time (in this case thirty (30) years). Under this
System, the current level of contribution paid by the employer is based on the actuarial assumption
that in the three (3) years that an employee uses for calculating his retirement allowance, the
employee cannot use any compensation which exceeds the 10% limitation, unless one of the three
2

(3) exceptions are met as discussed below. If employees are allowed to avoid the 10% limitation,
(except for the three (3) exceptions to be discussed below), the System would not be maintained on
an actuarial sound basis. If employees are not properly held to the 10% limitation, the statutory and
fiduciary mandate of maintaining a System on an actuarial sound basis would be in jeopardy.
POINT II
THE BOARD PROPERLY APPLIED THE 10% LIMITATION IN THIS CASE
Alfred's argument fails to recognize that there are two distinct components of compensation
at issue in this case. The first is an increase in salary due to promotion. The second is an increase
in salary due to significant overtime. These two types of compensation are treated differently under
Utah Code Ann. § 49-3-103(7). Subsection 7(a) states that in the absence of an express exception
found in subsection (b), any increase in annual compensation, which includes overtime, is subject
to the 10% limitation. Therefore, the general rule is that an increase in annual compensation is
subject to the limitation.
Subsection 7(b) (ii) states that the compensation attributable to a promotion is not subject to
the 10% limitation. Allred received a promotion in September of 1993 and his hourly rate went from
fifteen dollars and seven cents ($15.07) per hour to sixteen dollars and fifty six cents ($16.56).
There was no limitation placed on this amount since it fell within the exception stated in subsection
7(b)(ii).
Three (3) months prior to the promotion, Allred began receiving substantial overtime which
had not been present during his earlier years of employment. The substantial increase in pay due to
overtime was obviously not due to his promotion since the overtime began several months before
he received the promotion. Under these circumstances, the increase due to overtime is simply an
3

increase in compensation which is subject to the general rule which states that increases in
compensation are subject to the 10% limitation for the calculation of retirement benefits.
Even assuming for the moment that Allred has met his burden of proof that the increase in
overtime is a result of the promotion, (which is discussed more fully below) there are still two
distinct components of compensation. Overtime is not one of the exceptions to the 10% limitation.
Overtime, for purposes of this statute, is treated as any other increase in salary and is subject to the
general 10% limitation.
As stated above, Allred was granted credit for the entire increase in his salary due to his
promotion which equaled approximately 10% of his salary. On top of that 10%, Allred was granted
10% of his increase in salary due to the overtime, plus the statutorily mandated cost-of-living
increase which equaled 3%. In real terms, Allred was granted credit for a 23% increase in his
compensation in one year.
The plain reading of the statutes shows that overtime pay is subject to the 10% limitation on
the increase in salary for the purpose of calculating retirement benefits.
POINT III
UTAH CODE ANN. § 49-3-103(7)(c) DOES NOT APPLY TO THE PRESENT CASE
Petitioner claims that Utah Code Ann. § 49-3-103(7) (c) is a stand alone provision dispositive
of this case. This subsection reads:
For purposes of computing the member's final average salary only,
the member is considered to have been in service at his last salary rate
from the date of the termination of employment to the date retirement
becomes effective if the member so requests.
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Contrary to Allred's position, Utah Code Ann. § 49-3-103(7) (c) does not apply to the present
case. Adopting Allred's position would have the effect of rendering the remainder of this section
meaningless or, in the alternative, placing the System in a position of being actuarially unsound.
Utah courts have long held that interpretations such as the one urged by Allred are in error
and will not be accepted:
We have long adhered to the well established principle of statutory
construction that "[a] statute should be construed so that effect is
given to all provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or
superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will not
destroy another." Brickyard Home Owners Association Management
Committee v. Gibbons Realty Company. 668 P.2d 535, 538 (Utah
1983).
Faux v. Mickelson. 725 P.2d 1372, 1374 (Utah 1986).
The general rule is that all sections of a legislative enactment should
be construed together [citation omitted] . . . the general purpose,
intent or purport of the whole statute should control and . . . all parts
[should] be interpreted as subsidiary and harmonious.
Matter of Adoption of M.L.T.. 746 P.2d 1179, 1180 (Utah App. 1987).
(See also, Clover v. Snow Bird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991): AMX
Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 796 P.2d 1256, 1258; Ferro v. Utah Department of
Commerce. 828 P.2d 507, 511 (Utah App. 1992); and Grant v. Utah State Land Board. 485 P.2d
1035, 1037 (Utah 1971)).
Allred's interpretation of subsection 7(c) would violate this well established cannon of
statutory construction by rendering subsection 7(a) and (b) completely meaningless. Subsection 7(c)
only applies in the following situation. For example, if a member terminates his employment in
1995 with fifteen (15) years of service at age sixty four and one half (64 V2), he does not qualify for
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a full unreduced retirement for another six (6) months when he reaches age sixty five (65).
However, that employee is considered to have been in service (for purposes of computing salary
only, not the accrual of service credit) at his rate of pay from the date of termination until the
effective retirement date, when he attains age sixty five (65). In this example, for the six (6) month
period between age sixty four and one half (64 Vi) and sixty five (65) the member would be
considered to have been receiving the rate of pay he was receiving when he terminated employment.
Therefore, subsection 7(c), when appropriately understood, only applies to the period
between the employee's termination of employment and his effective date of retirement. It does not
apply in situations where the termination of employment and the effective date of retirement are
simultaneous such as the present case.
PQINTIV
ALLRED'S OVERTIME WAS NOT DIRECTELY AND SOLELY LINKED TO THE
PROMOTION
A.

Petitioner should not be permitted to submit new facts in his Reply Brief,

Alfred's argument is that the statutory limitations on increase in compensation for retirement
benefit purposes are not applicable to his specific situation because he was required to work overtime
as part of his promotion. In order for Alfred's argument to have a chance of prevailing, there must
be a factual termination that the overtime is directly and solely based on the promotion. Otherwise,
the increase in pay due to overtime is clearly subject to the limitation. While there was a stipulation
as to the existence of overtime hours at the hearing, there was no stipulation that the overtime hours
were directly a result of the promotion.

6

At the evidentiary hearing before the Administrative Law Judge, Allred was present with
counsel but offered no testimony concerning a connection between his promotion and the overtime
work. (R 16-40). In Allred's initial memorandum, there are no allegations made or any evidence
submitted which links the overtime to the promotion. (R 41-45). It is only after the fatal flaw in
evidence brought to Alfred's attention by the Board that Allred makes any attempt to present the key
evidence. (See Alfred's reply brief, R 88-107).
There are a number of problems with the evidence submitted with Alfred's reply brief. First,
it is not submitted by affidavit or given any context whatsoever. Second, there is no attempt to give
any meaning to the evidence in light of the current controversy. There are no dates given for
overtime work or the period of overtime that the evidence is supposed to address. There are no
employment records, time records, or payment records that give the proper factual support for the
proposition that the overtime work was proper and linked to the promotion. The authors of the
letters make no attempt to fashion their statements to address the specifics of the overtime pay as it
relates to this controversy.
In addition to the evidence being sketchy and unable to meet the burden of proof, Allred has
effectively denied the Board any chance to cross examine witnesses, clarify, or make some sense
of the evidence submitted. The evidentiary hearing had come and gone and all briefs had been
submitted without the Board having the opportunity to find out the background and context of the
evidence or make any meaningful response.
Under the circumstances, the Administrative Law Judge correctly refused to include any of
the improper evidence in his Findings of Fact. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8 sets forth the procedures
for a formal adjudicative proceeding. Subsection (d) states "The presiding officer shall afford to
7

all parties the opportunities to present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross examination, and
submit rebuttal evidence." Due to the untimely submission of evidence to support its case in chief,
Allred deprived the Board of cross examining witnesses and responding to evidence.
Utah courts have also recognized that evidence that should have been submitted in a party's
case in chief cannot be submitted as rebuttal evidence.
In White v. Kent Medical Ctr. Inc.. 61 Wash. App. 163, 810 P.2d 4, 8 (1991), the
Washington Court of Appeals stated:
It is the responsibility of the moving party to raise in its . . .
motion all of the issues on which it believes it is to [prevail].
Allowing the moving party to raise new issues in its rebutta^ material
is improper because the non-moving party has no opportunity to
respond. It is for this reason that, in the analogous area of appeal
review, the rule is well settled that the court will not consider issues
raised for the first time in a reply brief. Id (Emphases added.)
(Citations omitted.)
The Washington court held that the trial court improperly considered an issue first
raised in movant's reply memorandum. Id at 8-9
Since defendant first raised the
issue in his reply memorandum, it was not properly before the trial court and we will
not consider for the first time on appeal. (Citations omitted.)
State v. Phathammavong. 860 P.2d 1001, 1003 (Utah App. 1993).
(See also Soliz v. Ammerman. 395 P.2d 25 (Utah 1964). Case law from other states also
supports this position. See e.g. Deyoe v. Clark Equipment Co. Inc.. 655 P.2d 1333, 1336 (Az. App.
1982). Legal commentators are also in accord with this position.
One cannot, as a matter of right, offer in rebuttal evidence which was proper or
should have been introduced in chief, even though it tends to contradict the adverse
party's evidence, and, while the court may in its discretion admit in rebuttal evidence
which more properly should have been introduced in chief, it may, in its discretion,
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and generally should, decline to permit either party to introduce evidence in support
of its case in chief on rebuttal, especially on a subject fully covered in his case in
chief, unless sufficient reason is offered for not introducing it at the proper time.
88 Corpus Juris Secondum. Trial, Section 102.
Allred was with his counsel at the hearing, but offered no evidence on his behalf. The
hearing had been set for some period of time before it actually took place. Allred's position
throughout this matter appeared to be that he was relying on the promotion exception to the 10%
limitation rule. As such, there is no reason why he could not have prepared his evidence before the
evidentiary hearing and submitted it at the hearing. Allred failed to meet his burden of proof at the
hearing, failed to make any allegations, and failed to present any factual evidence in his initial brief
after the evidentiary hearing, and only provided sketchy evidence in his reply memorandum. Under
these circumstances, the Administrative Law Judge was correct in not basing his Findings of Facts
and Conclusions of Law on this evidence.
Moreover, the only evidence that has been presented that links the overtime to the promotion
is hearsay evidence. While hearsay evidence is allowed in administrative proceedings (see Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-8(c)), Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-10(3) states "no finding of fact that was
contested may be based solely on hearsay evidence unless that evidence is admissible under the Utah
Rules of Evidence."
Allred has relied completely on hearsay evidence to met his burden of proof that the overtime
was a direct result of the promotion. The letters submitted by Allred in his reply memorandum are
out of court statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted and are clearly hearsay. (See
Rule 801 (c) Utah Rules of Evidence.) Under the circumstances, the Administrative Law Judge was
correct in not relying on that hearsay evidence in making his Findings of Fact.
9

For all of the foregoing reasons, Allred failed to met his burden of proof in this matter, and
the Administrative Law Judge was correct in limiting his Findings of Fact to those contained in the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order.
B.

The evidence does not support Allred's allegations.

Through the evidence submitted with his reply brief, Allred apparently alleges that his
overtime pay is a direct result of his promotion. However, the uncontroverted facts refute this
position.
Allred received his promotion in September of 1993. (R 109). In July 1993, three months
prior to his promotion and one year prior to his termination, Allred began receiving substantial
overtime pay. (R 60, 110).
As discussed above, there is no question that Allred is subject to the 10% limitation unless
he can prove that the overtime work is a part of his promotion. Even if Allred can prove his
proposition, it is the Board's position that the overtime is still subject to the 10% limitation.
However, Allred cannot prove that the overtime was a direct result of the promotion since the
overtime began to accrue three (3) months prior to the promotion ever being given.
As a factual matter, Allred cannot meet his burden of proof because the uncontroverted facts
show that Allred began receiving substantial overtime prior to his promotion and therefore cannot
be a result of the promotion.
CONCLUSION
The facts of Alfred's case show that he is subject to the 10% limitation on increase in
compensation for purposes of calculation of his retirement benefit. The Board correctly applied the
10% limitation in calculating Alfred's retirement benefit. Therefore, the Board respectfully requests
10

that this Court affirm the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order of the
Administrative Law Judge.
DATED this 20th day of October, 1995.

Kevin A. Howard
Attorney for Appellee

Dafciel D. Andersen
Attorney for Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL
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John Walsh
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2319 Foothill Drive, Suite 270
Slat Lake City, UT 84109
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PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' NONCONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT ACT 49-3-103

(b) "Employee" or "regular employee" means an officer, elective or
appointive, who receives as compensation from an employer $500 or
more per month over a 12-month period adjusted by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index.
(6) "Employer" or "employing unit" means any department, educational institution, political subdivision, or eligible organization, or agency
financed in whole or in part by public funds for which any employee or
member performs services subject to this chapter.
(7) "Final average salary" means the amount computed by averaging
the highest three years of annual compensation preceding retirement
subject to Subsections (a), (b), and (c).
(a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), the percentage increase in
annual compensation in any one of the years used may not exceed the
previous year's salary by more than 10% plus a cost-of-living adjustment equal to the decrease in the purchasing power of the dollar
during the previous year, as measured by the Consumer Price Index
prepared by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics.
(b) In cases where the employing unit provides acceptable documentation to the board, the limitation in Subsection (a) may be exceeded if:
(i) the member has transferred from another employing unit;
(ii) the member has been promoted to a new position; or
(iii) the years used are not consecutive.
(c) For purposes of computing the member's final average salary
only, the member is considered to have been in service at his last
salary rate from the date of the termination of employment to the
date retirement becomes effective if the member so requests.
(8) "Normal retirement age" means the age of 65 years.
(9) "Organization or agency financed in whole or in part by public
funds" means an agency, association, or organization that receives public
funds. The term does not include political subdivisions, departments, or
educational institutions.
(10) "Public funds" means those funds derived, either directly or indirectly, from public taxes or public revenue, dues, or contributions paid or
donated by the membership of the organization used to finance an activity whose objective is to improve, on a nonprofit basis, the governmental,
educational, and social programs and systems of the state or its political
subdivisions.
(11) (a) "Regular full-time employee," in qualifying for membership in
the system, means an employee whose employment normally requires an average of 20 hours or more per week, except as modified
by the board, and who receives benefits normally provided by the
employing unit.
(b) "Regular full-time employee" includes a teacher who teaches
half-time or more or a classified school employee who works an average of 20 hours per week or more, regardless of benefits provided.
(12) "Years of service" or "service years" means:
(a) the number of periods, each to consist of 12 full months;
(b) a period determined by the board, whether consecutive or not,
during which an employee performed services for an employer or
employers, including any time the employee rendered service in the
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(c) Each term expires on June 30 in the year of expiration
(9) The council shall designate one council member as chairman annual 1
y
(10) The council shall:
*
(a) recommend benefits and policies for members of any system admin
istered by the board to the board and to the Legislature,
(b) recommend procedures and practices to improve the administration
of the system and the public employee relations responsibilities of the
board and office;
(c) examine the record of all decisions affecting retirement benefits*
(d) submit nominations to the board for the position of executive director if that position is vacant; and
(e) act upon all other duties assigned to it by the board
History: C. 1953, 49-1-202, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 1, § 5; 1987, ch. 112, § 1; 1988, ch.
102, § 1; 1991, ch. 214, § 1; 1992, ch. 157, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, in Subsection
(1) substituted "composed" for "comprised", in
Subsection (3), substituted "advice and consent for approval , in the instruction IanSU
(7) 8 C d B e
n n
f^/SLfn
° n, rewrote
' f , former
" P "Subsection
! S J" 1 *
1, 1991 and™ 13
(i), which read "One memoer shall be a retired
member selected alternately by the Utah Association of Retired Public Employees and the

Utah Retired School Employees' Association
and," and redesignated it as present Subsec
tions d) and 0), deleted former Subsection (j)*
pertaining to appointment of two other members by board, added Subsection (8) and redesl g n a t e d subsequent subsections accordingly
and m a d e related st hstlc and punctua*/'
changes
The 1992, .amendment,
10
. , „ ~ ' effect.ve
, March
* , 13
*
1ftoo
u
* ? ? » « * * * * * a * f « * retirement benefit
m
g em lo ee beneflts ln
» for *
*
*
f
P y
Subs e c t l o n (10Kc)
*

49-1-203. Powers and duties of board.
(1) The board shall:
(a) appoint an executive director to administer the retirement office;
(b) receive and act upon reports covering the operations of the systems,
plans, programs, and funds administered by the retirement office;
(c) ensure that the systems, plans, programs, and funds are administered according to law;
(d) sit as a board of appeal on any appeal filed by a member of a system,
plan, or program or by a covered employer;
(e) examine and approve an annual operating budget for the retirement office;
(f) serve as investment trustees of the retirement fund;
(g) maintain, in conjunction with participating employers and members, the systems, plans, and programs on an actuarially sound or approved basis, subject to the responsibility of the Legislature to adjust
benefits and contribution rates when recommended by the board;
(h) receive and act upon recommendations of the executive director;
(l) recommend to the governor and Legislature any necessary or desirable changes in the statutes governing the systems, plans, and programs
administered by the retirement office;
(j) develop broad policy for the long-term operation of the various retirement systems, plans, and programs and is granted broad discretion
and power to perform its policymaking functions;
(k) establish the compensation of the director and adopt compensation
plans and policies based on market surveys for fiduciary and administrative positions in the office;
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(1) regulate the duties of employing units and other public authorities
which are imposed upon them by this chapter and specify the time, place,
and manner in which contributions shall be withheld and paid, and obtain any reports necessary for the administration of this chapter;
(m) adopt rules consistent with this chapter for the management of the
systems, plans, and programs in order to carry out the purposes of this
chapter, and perform all other acts necessary for the administration of the
retirement systems, plans, and programs;
(n) comply with the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter
46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its adjudicative proceedings;
(0) shall otherwise exercise the powers and perform the duties conferred on it by this chapter; and
(p) provide for audits of the retirement system.
(2) The board may:
(a) subpoena witnesses and compel their attendance to testify before it,
for which purpose each member and the secretary of the board may administer oaths and affirmations to witnesses and others transacting business of the retirement system;
(b) establish membership councils to advise the board and the director
on policies affecting members of any system administered by the board
and may pay the travel expenses of members who attend council meetings; and
(c) sue and be sued in its own name.
History: C. 1953, 49-1-203, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 1, § 6; 1987, ch. 161, § 148; 1988,
ch. 179, § 1; 1989, ch. 81, § 2; 1990, ch. 153,
i 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective March 9, 1990, added the Ianguage beginning and adopt compensation
plans in Subsection (l)(k), inserted Adminis-

trative Procedures Act" in Subsection (l)(n),
added Subsection (l)(p) and made related
changes, and deleted a comma in Subsection
(2Kb)
Cross-References. — Social Security benef l t s f o r p u b h c employees, Title 67, Chapter 11.
S t a t e r e t l r e m e n t office, creation, § 49-1-201

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Public meetings.
The Open and Public Meetings Act is not
applicable to the retirement board Ellis v

Utah State Retirement Bd, 757 P.2d 882
(Utah Ct App 1988), afFd, 783 P.2d 540 (Utah
1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 81A C J.S States § 112
Key Numbers. — States «=» 64 1

49-1-204. Powers and duties of executive director.
The executive director shall:
(1) act as the executive officer of the board and the retirement office;
(2) administer the various acts, systems, plans, programs, and functions assigned to the board or office;
(3) develop and promulgate, with the approval of the board, administrative rules which are within the authority granted by this title, in the
administration of the various retirement systems, plans, and programs;
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(4) transmit to the board any appeals received from members of
retirement system, plan, or program under this title, or any covered ^
ployer, arising out of a ruling of the director, and to arrange a heari
before the board for any affected party;
8
(5) keep the board, the governor, the Legislature, and its agencies and
other affected officers, associations, and groups informed on the oper
tions of the retirement office;
(6) recommend to the board any necessary or desirable changes in th
retirement statutes;
(7) serve as a consultant on all retirement legislation;
(8) recommend to the board an annual administrative budget covering
the operations of the retirement office and, upon approval, submit the
budget to the governor and the Legislature for their examination and
approval; after which the director shall direct and control the subsequent
expenditures of the budget;
(9) employ, within the limitations of the budget, staff personnel and
consultants to administer the retirement systems, plans, programs, and
funds assigned to the retirement office, including actuaries, attorneys,
medical examiners, investment counselors, accountants, and clerical and
other assistants to accomplish the purpose of the retirement office;
(10) develop, with approval of the board, common administrative procedures and rules for each of the retirement systems, plans, and programs
administered by the retirement office;
(11) establish, with approval of the board, independent records for each
of the retirement systems, plans, and programs or combine all records
using acceptable principles of fund accounting to identify the assets and
vested interests of each retirement system, plan, or program;
(12) credit contributions of employers and other accounts with interest
at the rate adopted in accordance with Subsection (13);
(13) from time to time, upon the recommendation of the consulting
actuary, adopt interest rates, mortality tables, and other tables necessary
for the administration of the systems, plans, and programs;
(14) keep in convenient form all records and accounts necessary for the
administration of the systems, plans, and programs and data for investigation of its experience and its actuarial valuation;
(15) consolidate into one warrant all monthly payments of annuities,
pensions, and subsistence payments made to each retired member as long
as the integrity of the various funds is maintained through appropriate
accounting records which shall be established;
(16) comply with the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter
46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in any adjudicative proceedings conducted by the director; and
(17) from time to time, but at least biennially, and in cooperation with
the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel, make an actuarial investigation into the mortality, service, and other experience of the
members and beneficiaries of the systems, plans, and programs, actuarially value the assets and liabilities of the administered funds and accounts, determine the rate of interest being earned by the funds, and,
based upon all these determinations and factors, including items requested by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel, shall
confer with that office and report findings of the investigation, with rec114
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ommendations, to the Legislature along with any changes in the rates of
contribution or benefits that are necessary to the security of the system,
plan, or program. Costs of the investigation, as well as all actuarial consulting and other services, shall be paid from the interest earnings of the
fund.
History: C. 1953, 49-1-204, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 1, § 7; 1987, ch. 161, § 149; 1988,
en. 179, § 2; 1989, ch. 22, § 27; 1990, ch. 153,
§ 3.

Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective March 9, 1990, inserted "Administrative Procedures Act" in Subsection
(16).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Power to employ attorneys.
The attorney general does not have exclusive
constitutional authority to act as legal advisor
to the state retirement board; therefore, the
provision authorizing the employment of attorneys does not violate Utah Const, Art. VH,

Sec. 16; furthermore, this provision is an exception to the general authority of the attorney
general to perform legal services for any
agency of state government. Hansen v. Utah
State Retirement Bd., 652 P.2d 1332 (Utah
1982).

PART 3
THE RETIREMENT INVESTMENT FUND
49-1-301. Creation — Board to act as trustees of the fund
— Commingling and pooling of funds — Interest
earnings.
(1) There is created for the purpose of enlarging the investment base and
simplifying investment procedures and functions a common trust fund knowix
as the "Utah State Retirement Investment Fund." The board shall act as
trustees of the fund, and through its executive officer, may commingle and
pool the funds and investments of any retirement system into the Utah State
Retirement Investment Fund, as long as the principal amounts of the participating funds do not lose their individual identity and are maintained as separate trust funds on the books of the retirement office. In combining the investments of any fund, each of the participating funds shall be credited initially
with its share of the total assets transferred to the Utah State Retirement
Investment Fund, the calculation being made on the basis of the book value of
the various investments at the time the investments are credited to the Utah
State Retirement Investment Fund. Subsequent transfers of additional capital
from participating funds shall be credited similarly to its respective trust
account. Funds may be withdrawn or transferred out of the Utah State Retirement Investment Fund and credited back to a participating fund, but at no
time may the income or principal or equity credit belonging to one participating fund be transferred to another. The assets of the participating funds are
for the exclusive benefit of the members and may not be diverted or appropriated for any purpose other than that permitted by this chapter or the chapters
covering the individual participating funds.
(2) Interest and other earnings shall be credited to each participating fund
on a pro rata basis monthly, or otherwise as directed by the board. A portion of
the interest and other earnings of the common trust fund may be credited to a
115
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Standing.
Intervention in administrative proceeding
based on stipulation that Subsection (2)(a) was
satisfied did not confer standing to pursue
claims on appeal that were outside the scope of
the stipulation. Sierra Club v. Department of
Envtl. Quality, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (Ct.
App. 1993).

63-46b-10

Allegations by members of environmental
organization that their use and enjoyment of
Western Utah would have been adversely affected failed to show or allege any specific injury causally related to the alleged illegal activity. Sierra Club v. Department of Envtl.
Quality, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (Ct. App.
1993).

63-46b-10. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings — Orders.
In formal adjudicative proceedings:
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hearing, or after the filing of any
post-hearing papers permitted by the presiding officer, or within the time
required by any applicable statute or rule of the agency, the presiding
officer shall sign and issue an order that includes:
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's findings of fact based exclusively on the evidence of record in the adjudicative proceedings or
on facts officially noted;
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's conclusions of law;
(c) a statement of the reasons for the presiding officer's decision;
(d) a statement of any relief ordered by the agency;
(e) a notice of the right to apply for reconsideration;
(f) a notice of any right to administrative or judicial review of the
order available to aggrieved parties; and
(g) the time limits applicable to any reconsideration or review.
(2) The presiding officer may use his experience, technical competence,
and specialized knowledge to evaluate the evidence.
(3) No finding of fact that was contested may be based solely on hearsay evidence unless that evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of
Evidence.
(4) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from issuing
interim orders to:
(a) notify the parties of further hearings;
(b) notify the parties of provisional rulings on a portion of the
issues presented; or
(c) otherwise provide for the fair and efficient conduct of the adjudicative proceeding.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-10, enacted by L.
' c h. 161, § 266; 1988, ch. 72, § 20.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Extents of order.
*ffct to appeal.
^ n t s of order.
is section requires considerable detail in
I*?? or ders issued in connection with formal
icative procedures, so an ambiguous let-

ter, merely indicating that the request for reconsideration was unpersuasive, was not a
"written order" under § 63-46b-13(3). Lopez v.
Career Serv. Review Bd., 834 P.2d 568 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992).
Right to appeal.
When a right to reconsideration exists, Subsection (l)(e) of this section requires notice to
petitioner of that right; Real Estate Commis-
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UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
.^ ^ *|3 # prior statements of witnesses.
JKl Examining witness concerning prior state&$_* j n examining a witness concerning a prior
ent made by him, whether written or not, the
n^ n e e d not be shown nor its contents disi *p n j m at that time, but on request the same
r
^ ^ b * shown or disclosed to opposing counsel.
S R gjtrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent
OJSlinent of witness. Extrinsic evidence of a prior
rJJTJjitcnt statement by a witness is not admissible
SK^the witness is afforded an opportunity to exSfe or deny the same and the opposite party is afCZd an opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or
"Slfttfrests of justice otherwise require. This provi'£do#» not apply to admissions of a party-opponent
!
^iflDed in Rule 80Hdi<2).
*614. Calling and interrogation of witnesses
by court.
[Calling by court. The court may, on its own
j Or at the suggestion of a party, call witnesses,
fill parties are entitled to cross-examine witthus called.
[Interrogation by court. The court may interwitnesses, whether called by itself or by a

Rule 801

Rule 703. Bases of opinion testimony by experts.
The facts or data in the particular case upon which
an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those
perceived by or made known to him at or before the
hearing. Ifofa type reasonably relied upon by experts
in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence.
Rule 704. Opinion on ultimate issue.
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier
of fact.
Rule 705. Disclosure of facts or data underlying
expert opinion.
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the
court requires otherwise. The expert may in any
event be required to disclose the underlying facts or
data on cross-examination.

Rule 706. Court-appointed experts.
(a) Appointment. The court may on its own moI Objections. Objections to the calling of wit- tion or on the motion of any party enter an order to
Ii.by the courc or to interrogation by it may be show cause why expert witnesses should not be aplit the time or at the next available opportunity pointed, and may request the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert witnesses
Ltht jury is not present.
agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint expert
4 J115. Exclusion of witnesses.
witnesses of its own selection. An expert witness
HP At the request of a party the court shall order shall not be appointed by the court unless he consents
HIM excluded so that they cannot hear the testi- to act. A witness so appointed shall be informed of his
[ Of Other witnesses, and it may make the order duties by the court in writing, a copy of which shall
I motion. This rule does not authorize exclu- be filed with the clerk, or at a conference in which the
parties shall have opportunity to participate. A witffi) • party who is a natural person;
ness so appointed shall advise the parties of his find, (b) an officer or employee of a party which is ings, if any; his deposition may be taken by any
ji_ natural person designated as its represen- party; and he may be called to testify by the court or
Itfvt' by its attorney;
any party. He shall be subject to cross-examination
a person whose presence is shown by a by each party, including a party calling him as a wit1
to be essential to the presentation of his ness.
* or
(b) Compensation. Expert witnesses so appointed
' an adult victim in a criminal trial where are entitled to reasonable compensation in whatever
^Jfaaecutor agrees with the victim's presence. sum the court may allow. The compensation thus
^court may exclude or excuse a victim from fixed is payable from funds which may be provided by
*0om tf he becomes disruptive.
law in criminal cases and civil actions and proceed* adult victim in a criminal trial who elects to ings involving just compensation under the Fifth
n
e courlro
tf!J ^
°m may not be prevented Amendment. In other civil actions and proceedings
tyn& even after being present and having
the compensation shall be paid by the parties in such
l*ftar
•* testimony.
Infective April 29, 1991 by L. 1991, ch. 24, proportion and at such time as the court directs, and
thereafter charged in like manner as other costs.
(c) Disclosure of appointment. In the exercise of
its discretion, the court may authorize disclosure to
?CLE VII. OPINIONS AND EXPERT
the jury of the fact that the court appointed the exTESTIMONY.
pert witness.
(d) Parties' experts of own selection. Nothing in
. P i n i o n testimony by lay witnesses.
this rule limits the parties in calling expert witnesses
" fethVS n 0 t t e s t i f v i n g a« an expert, his
of their own selection.
Jaa cm* m ° f °P i n i o n s o r inferences is limnS r i n f e r e n c
f*ta*dn *u °
es which are (a) ran h e erc
P eption of the witness and (b)
cu
ARTICLE VIII. HEARSAY.
ear understanding of his testimony or
lnatl
°n of a fact i n l s s u e
Rule 801. Definitions.
The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or
Wc?^° ny b y ex P erts 1
written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a
•*UttK l C a 1 , 0 r o t h e r specialized knowlperson, if it is intended by him as an assertion.
S to det t n e r ° f f a c t t 0 understand the
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who
1 an evn mmLe a f a c t i n i s s u e » a witness
makes a statement.
»R or ;I b y knowledge, skill, experi(r*\ Uaofcav "Hflarcov" ic a etatprnpnt r>thpr
"« Or education

Jl^:r.. *u

/I

;„

at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A
statement is not hearsay if:
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is
subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony or the witness denies
having made the statement or has forgotten,
or (B) consistent with his testimony and is
offered to rebut an express or implied charge
against him of recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving him;
or
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The
statement is offered against a party and is
(A) his own statement, in either his individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a
statement of which he has manifested his
adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by him to make
a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a
statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency
or employment, made during the existence of
the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and
in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Rule 802. Hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by
law or by these rules.
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial.
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule,
even though the declarant is available as a witness:
(1) Present sense impression. A statement
describing or explaining an event or condition
made while the declarant was perceiving the
event or condition or immediately thereafter.
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating
to a startling event or condition made while the
declarant was under the stress of excitement
caused by the event or condition.
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or
physical condition. A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan,
motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily
health), but not including a statement of memory
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed
unless it relates to the execution, revocation,
identification, or terms of declarant's will.
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source
thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum
or record concerning a matter about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable him to testify fully
and accurately, shown to have been made or
adopted by the witness when the matter was
fresh in his memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum or

record may be read into evidence K
itself be received as an exhibit unl
^
an adverse party.
^t
(6) Records of regularly corid
^
ity. A memorandum, report,* record U°*** *8E
pilation, in any form, of acts, events* *^M2!
opinions or diagnoses, made at or n ' f
by, or from information transmitted?' * M l 8
with knowledge, if kept in the c o u r s e ^ ^ S
larly conducted business activity, ani/ir^fc
the regular practice of that businesslJu'L*^
make the memorandum, report, recorJlTf^l
compilation, all as shown by the'testiilkl?^1^
custodian or other qualified witness toS^f^
source of information or the method * * ^ j
stances of preparation indicate lack ofnJ-!^
thiness. The term "business" as used in u?"1''11*
graph includes business, institution, aaitaSfi?
profession, occupation, and callingofevtrtfS
whether or not conducted for profit. **?*§S
(7) Absence of entry in records kept t H
cordance with the provisions of p i r l f ? j i
(6). Evidence that a matter is not includSwft
memoranda, reports, records, or data Cttuik!
tions, in any form, kept in accordance wk?S
provisions of Paragraph (6), to prove IhTilSj
currence or nonexistence of the matter 78l
matter was of a kind of which a memorial
report, record, or data compilation was r«f2y
made and preserved, unless the sources o f j S
mation or other circumstances indicate li?M
l
trustworthiness.
™
(8) Public records and reports. Recof^£;
ports, statements, or data compilations, la afti
form, of public offices or agencies, settiof tSL
(A) the activities of the office or agency, Of ft
matters observed pursuant to duty impct*4 W
law as to which matters there was a duty felt
port, excluding, however, in criminal cast* ft£
ters observed by police officers and other law *
forcement personnel, or (C) in civil actiOAIiij
proceedings and against the Governmttl j |
criminal cases, factual findings resulting frOOIS
investigation made pursuant to authtrif
granted by law, unless the sources of in formate
or other circumstances indicate lack of truitltf
thiness.
(9) Records of vital statistics. RettA JT
data compilations, in any form, of births, W
deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report
was made to a public office pursuant to rtqt&fc
ments of law.
(10) Absence of public record or entryiH
prove the absence of a record, report, staUBHfc,
or data compilation, in any form, or the WJ*;
currence or nonexistence of a matter of whkfcl
record, report, statement, or data compilatWiP
any form, was regularly made and preserved wl
public office or agency, evidence in the fonBwi
certification in accordance with Rule 902, OTJF.
timony, that diligent search failed to disclortll
record, report, statement, or data compilau*V*
entry.
^^
(11) Records of religious organiww>
Statements of births, marriages, d i w *
deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, relationship W
blood or marriage, or other similar facts w F
sonal or family history, contained in a regw**
kept record of a religious organization.
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and simUarjJJ
tificates. Statements of fact contained in aCJ^J
icate that the maker performed a mam*1*

